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Abstract: Relying on a natural experiment consisting in 130 competitions for promotion to associate 
and full professor in the Italian University, we analyze whether gender discrimination is affected by 
the  gender  of  evaluators.  Taking  advantage  of  the  random  assignment  of  evaluators  to  each 
competition, we examine the probability of success of each candidate in relation to the committee 
gender composition, controlling for candidates’ scientific productivity and a number of individual 
characteristics. We find that female candidates are less likely to be promoted when the committee is 
composed exclusively by males, while the gender gap disappears when the candidates are evaluated by 
a mixed sex committee. Results are qualitatively similar across fields and type of competitions. The 
analysis of candidates’ decisions to withdraw from competition highlights that gender differences in 
preferences  for  competition  play  only  a  minor  role  in  explaining  gender  discrimination.  It  also 
emerges that withdrawal decisions are not affected by the committee gender composition and therefore 
the gender discrimination is not related to self-fulfilling expectations. 
JEL classification: D72, D78; J45, J71 
Keywords:  Gender Discrimination; Evaluators’ Gender; Affirmative Actions; Academic Promotion ; 
Withdrawal Decision; Natural Experiment; Random Assignment. 
 
1. Introduction 
Female education levels have recently improved considerably and female labor force participation has 
risen in most countries. However, in many spheres of human life gender inequality is still pervasive. A 
huge literature shows that female employees earn less than males even when they have the same levels of 
education,  work  experience  and  professional  qualification  (see,  among  others,  Blau  and  Kahn,  2003; 
Altonji and Blank, 1999; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). A number of papers show that in 
many countries the gender wage gap is increasing across the wage distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2007; 
Albrecht et al., 2003) and that women face the so called “glass ceiling”, that is,  they remain greatly 
underrepresented in higher paying jobs and in top positions, probably because promotion procedures favor 
men rather than women. For example, some recent works examining promotions and pay in the academic 
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labor market show that women suffer a disadvantage in promotions and a within-rank pay gap (Blackaby 
et al., 2005; McDowell et al., 1999; Ginther and Kahn, 2004). 
An interesting issue is to what extent discrimination depends on the gender of evaluators. At the 
best of our knowledge only a few works have tried to examine this issue. Two recent papers by Bagues 
and Esteve-Volart (2010) and by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011), based, respectively, on a recruitment 
procedure  for  positions  in  the  Spanish  Judiciary  and  on  competitions  to  associate  and  full  professor 
positions in Spain, reach rather ambiguous results. Whereas from Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) it 
emerges that female candidates are less likely to be hired when the randomly assigned selection committee 
is characterized by a higher percentage of female evaluators, Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) show that 
committees  with  a  relatively  larger  share  of  females  reduce  gender  discrimination  against  women  in 
competitions  to  full  professors  positions,  but  they  find  no  statistically  significant  effect  as  regards 
competitions to associate professor. 
A different approach has been taken by some works investigating the impact produced by female 
boss on female employees. Bell (2005) using US data finds that women-led firms hire more top executive 
women and pay higher wages to female workers compared to men-led firms. Similarly, Cardoso and 
Winter-Ebmer (2007), using data from Portugal, show that female leadership in firms leads to higher 
wages for women and lower wages for males. Goldin and Rouse (2000) show that female musicians have 
increased their probability of being hired in prevailingly male symphony orchestra after the adoption of 
“blind” auditions with a “screen” to conceal the candidate’s identity from the jury. In an educational 
context, Lavy (2008), analyzing the existence of gender discrimination in teachers’ evaluation of students 
comparing results in a blind and in a non-blind test, shows that the gender bias is sensitive to the gender of 
evaluators, but the direction of the effect varies across disciplines.  
In this paper we try to shed more light on this issue providing new evidence on whether the gender 
of evaluators matters for discrimination. We base our analysis on a natural experiment involving the 
Italian academic promotion system for associate and full professor positions. Our framework shares with 
the papers of Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) and Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) the same identification 
strategy, based on the random assignment of evaluators to competitions.  
Thanks to the random assignment procedure followed in Italy to select the members of evaluation 
committees for competitions to associate and full professor positions  opened in 2008, we are able to 
estimate  the  probability  of  success  of  candidates  in  relation  to  the  committee  gender  composition, 
avoiding  endogeneity  problems  deriving  from  unobservable  factors  that  may  be  correlated  with 
committees’ and candidates’ characteristics. 
  Unfortunately,  data  on  these  competitions  are  not  readily  available  and  have  to  be  collected 
reading  the  official  reports  produced  by  each  committee.  Since  collecting  data  on  all  promotion 
procedures would have been an unmanageable task, we have decided to focus on promotion procedures in 
only  two fields:  Economics  and  Chemistry.  More precisely,  we  use data  on  130 public  competitions 
involving about 1,000 candidates evaluated by 650 professors. 3 
 
For each committee member and for each candidate we have collected data on the number of 
publications, the number of citations, h and g indexes, and on the university where they worked at the time 
of the competition. We have used these information to build indicators of candidates’ and committees’ 
scientific productivity, to identify whether candidates are insiders in the university opening the vacancy 
and to find out professional networks between candidates and committee members. 
Controlling for all these factors, we have estimated the probability of success of each candidate. 
From our analysis it emerges that female candidates have a lower probability of success compared to their 
male  counterparts  (3.7  percentage  points  less).  Since  we  control  for  a  large  number  of  individual 
characteristics and for a number of quite reliable measures of individual productivity, we are confident 
that – in comparison to the large part of the literature on gender wage gap (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 
2004) – our results are less affected by problems deriving from unobservable characteristics, unbalanced 
across gender, that may determine individual earnings.  
As regards the effect of the committee gender composition, we find that female candidates are 
significantly less likely to be promoted when the randomly assigned committee is composed exclusively 
by males: in this case the probability of success of females is about 6-7 percentage points less. On the 
contrary,  the  presence  of  female  members  in  the  committee  allows  to  overcome  almost  completely 
discrimination against women. The impact of committee gender composition turns out to be about the 
same in specifications controlling for individual fixed effects preventing any bias arising from correlation 
of gender with unobservable characteristics. This result holds true both for the Economics and Chemistry 
fields. As regards heterogeneous effects across different type of positions, we find that in competitions to 
associate professor, committees composed exclusively by males operate a stronger discrimination against 
women than that emerging in competitions to full professor positions. Moreover, the improvement  in 
female outcomes produced by a mixed sex committee is smaller in magnitude in competitions to associate 
professor.  
One new and interesting characteristic of our data is that we observe whether applying candidates 
decided to withdraw from competition during the evaluation process. This allows us to investigate whether 
the observed gender discrimination is related to the fact that women tend to shy away from competition 
and to be less career oriented (Booth, 2009; Manning and Saidi, 2010; Bertrand, 2011). We find that 
females  are  more  likely  to  withdraw  from  competitions  to  associate  professor,  while  there  are  no 
statistically significant differences in competitions to full professor positions. Nevertheless, for both types 
of competitions, we show that gender discrimination  emerges also when we consider exclusively the 
sample  of  subjects  that  have  not  withdrawn  from  competition,  implying  that  gender  differences  in 
preferences for competition play only a minor role in explaining the bias against women emerging in our 
analysis. 
The availability of data on withdrawal decisions allows us also to evaluate whether the effect of 
committee gender composition on female probability of success depends on self-fulfilling expectations, 
since, at least in principle, women may decide to retire their candidacy once they know the committee 4 
 
composition. We do not find any statistically significant effect of the committee gender composition on 
female’s  probability  of  withdrawing  from  competition.  Moreover,  the  positive  impact  of  mixed  sex 
committees on female candidates’ probability of success persists also when we exclude from our sample 
those who have withdrawn from competition. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Italian academic promotion system and 
describes the data used in our analysis. In section 3 we carry out some random assignment checks. In 
section  4  we  show  our  estimation  results  on  the  impact  of  committee  gender  composition  on  female 
candidates’ probability of success. Section 5 is devoted at investigating differences across types of position 
and fields. In section 6 we investigate whether our results are robust to the exclusion of those candidates 
that have decided to withdraw from competition and whether the probability of withdrawing is related to 
the gender composition of the committee. In Section 7 we present candidate fixed effects estimates. In 
section 8 we offer a set of robustness checks. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Data  
Italy is one of the worst performing countries in terms of gender equality: in 2009, the Gender Gap Index 
ranks Italy at the 72
nd position, below Kazakhstan and Ghana. Women are underrepresented both in the 
public and in the private sector. Only 20% of seats in the parliament are held by women and only 3% of 
the  50  largest  companies’  board  directors  are  women.  As  far  as  the  academia  is  concerned,  women 
account for 45% of assistant professors,  34% of associate professors and for  20% of full professors. 
Although the number of women in the lower ranks has grown over time, the increase has been modest 
among higher positions. 
  The rules governing careers in the Italian Universities have changed over time. Abandoning a 
centralized and nationwide competition, a new mechanism was implemented for promotion to associate 
and full professor positions since 1999: each university willing to fill a vacancy initiated a competition and 
a committee of five members was selected to choose two or three winners (so called "idonei"). One 
member of the committee was appointed by the university opening the vacancy and the remaining four 
were elected by all professors in the field. 
These  rules  were  strongly  criticized  because  elected  committee  members  were  not  typically 
chosen with the aim to screen the best candidates but according to agreements among influential members 
of the academia, with the result that promotions were far from being related to candidates’ scientific 
productivity.
1 Nevertheless, in 2008, under this system, a huge number of vacancies (695 positions for full 
professors and 1,110 positions for associate professors) were opened by Italian Universities. At the end of 
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2008, the Italian Government, worried of the outcomes that could arise by the system in force, has decided 
to change the rules governing promotions to associate and full professor positions. The main change has 
concerned the way in which committees are selected: it has been established that four members out of five 
have to be randomly selected (among all the full professors in each field)
2 instead of being elected, while, 
as in the previous system, one member is appointed by the university opening the vacancy.  
Committee members meet to evaluate candidates and at the end of the evaluation process two 
winners for each evaluation procedure are selected. While in competitions to full professor candidates are 
evaluated exclusively on the basis of their CV, in competitions to associate professor skills shown by 
candidates in a teaching lecture are also taken into account. As in the previous system, the University that 
has initiated the competition can decide to appoint one of the winning candidates as professor, while the 
other can be appointed by another university within three years.  
As explained above, data on competitions have to be collected reading the final report produced 
by each committee at the end of the evaluation process. Due to the huge amount of work related to data 
collection, we have chosen to focus our attention exclusively on competitions undertaken in two relatively 
large fields: Economics (5 sub-fields)
3 and Chemistry (10 sub-fields).
4 We have chosen these two fields 
with the aim of analyzing both a scientific and a social science field. Among scientific fields, Chemistry 
was  characterized  by  a  quite  large  proportion  of  females,  while  other  fields,  such  as  Physics  or 
Engineering were excluded due to the extremely small number of female evaluators (mirroring the scarce 
presence of females in the field). Among social science fields, we have focused on economics because it 
was easier to find measures of individual productivity compared for example to Humanities or Sociology.    
By February 2011, 52 competitions (31 to associate professor and 21 to full professor)  were 
concluded in the Economics field, while in Chemistry 78 competitions (46 to associate professor and 32 to 
full professor) were completed. As a consequence, we end up with 130 evaluation procedures, involving 
1,007 candidates and 650 committee members. The average number of competitors for each competition is 
equal  to  17.53.  Candidates  were  allowed  to  apply  to  a  maximum  of  5  different  competitions.  Each 
candidate has applied on average to 2 competitions. The total number of observations at the candidate-
competition level is equal to 2279.  
During the evaluation process about 27% of candidates decided to withdraw from competition. 
Withdrawals  are  more  frequent  in  competitions  to  associate  professor  positions  (43.6%)  than  in 
competition to full professor positions (7.8%). The sample including only the candidates that maintain 
their candidacy until the conclusion of the evaluation procedure is made of 1,652 observations. 
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We have collected the list of evaluators, candidates and winners from the final reports produced 
by each committee. The gender has been inferred from the first name. Age has been taken from official 
reports or searching CVs on-line. In the few cases in which we were not able to find the year of birth we 
have imputed it as the year of graduation minus 24 (the age at which  typically high ability students 
graduate). 
To gather information on the scientific productivity of candidates and evaluators we have used the 
“Publish or Perish” software based on Google Scholar. More precisely, we have collected data on the 
number of publications, citations, h and g indexes, for each individual at the data of conclusion of each 
competition. We have decided to consider the publications until this date instead of until the date of 
application  since  long  delays  typically  occur  from  when  papers  are  accepted  for  publication  (and 
candidates include them in their CVs) and when publications appear as published in scientific journals. 
Using data on the number of publications and citations and on the h and g indexes, we have 
undertaken a principal component analysis to obtain a comprehensive measure of individual productivity 
(only  the  first  component  was  considered),  which we  call  Productivity.  For each  candidate  we  build 
Relative Productivity as the difference between his/her Productivity minus the average productivity of the 
other candidates in the competition. Moreover, this measure of productivity is used to calculate for each 
evaluation committee the average productivity of evaluators, considering only the four randomly selected 
members. 
The  affiliations  of  both  evaluators  and  candidates  have  been  obtained  from  the  Ministry  of 
Education, University and Research (MIUR)
5 and used to build a dummy variable Insider taking the value 
of one for candidates who work in the university opening the vacancy. Moreover, we build an indicator of 
professional networks between candidates and committee members, Connections, taking the value of one 
when there is at least a committee member (excluding the internal appointed evaluator) from the same 
university as the candidate and zero otherwise. 
Descriptive statistics for candidates and for evaluators are reported in Table 1. The percentage of 
female candidates is about 40%, higher in competitions to associate professors (45%) than in competitions 
to full professors (33%) (35% in Economics and 43% in Chemistry). Candidates to full professor positions 
over their lifetime have published on average 61 works receiving  469 citations, whereas the average 
number of publications of candidates to associate professor was 41 with 274 citations. About 15% of 
candidates are insiders and 10% of them has connections with at least one member of the committee. The 
great majority of candidates is performing an academic job (90%). On average, candidates are 44.7 years 
old,  candidates  to  associate  professor  positions  are  typically  younger  (41.7)  than  candidates  to  full 
professor positions (48.3) and chemistry candidates are older (46.7) than economics ones (42.1). 
 As  regards  evaluators,  we  focus  our  attention  exclusively  on  the  four  randomly  selected 
committee members and neglect the internal commissioner since the individual characteristics of the latter 
could be correlated to unobservable determinants of success of candidates. About 16% of the randomly 
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selected evaluators are females. 55% of committees are composed exclusively by males, 31% has one 
female member, and 10% and 4% percent of committees has, respectively, 2 and 3 female members. 
Given this distribution, we build a dummy variable Females in Committee taking the value of one when at 
least one female was among the committee members: 44.6% of committees have among their members a 
female evaluator. The average age of evaluators is 60 and about 28% of evaluators are from Universities 
of  the  South  of  Italy.  On  average  committee  members  over  their  lifetime  have  published  82  papers 
receiving 779 citations. 
  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  St. Dev  Min   Max  Observations 
    Candidates 
 
   
Success  0.113  0.317  0  1  2279 
             Associate Professor 











Female   0.397  0.489  0  1  2279 
             Associate Professor 











Number of Papers  50.491  37.740  0          269  2279 
             Associate Professor 
             Full Professor 
41.909 
61.010     
30.080 







Citations  362.502      491.504  0  4485  2279 
             Associate Professor 
             Full Professor 
274.811 
469.976     
384.017 







h-index  8.812    5.404  0  36  2279 
             Associate Professor 
             Full Professor 
7.726 
10.144     
4.814   







g-index  14.646          9.409  0           65  2279 
            Associate Professor  12.778  8.348  0  64  1255 
            Full Professor  16.935  10.109  0  65  1024 
Relative Productivity  0  1.758  -5.256  10.593  2279 
             Associate Professor 











Insider  0.147  0.355  0  1  2279 
             Associate Professor 





























Age  44.697  6.771  29  69  2279 
       Associate Professor  

















        Associate Professor  
              Full Professor 
0.873 
0.936     
0.333 







Withdrawn  0.275      0.446    0  1  2279 
        Associate Professor  











                
Committees’ members 
 
   
Females in Committee  0.446      0.4990  0  1  130 
% Females in Committee 
Age Com. members                   
Perc. of Com. members South 
Number of papers Com. members  










0.2047   
3.5786    
0.2459      
88.7533           
1591.934            
0.4933 
























3. Random Assignment Checks 
Our identification strategy is based on the random assignment of committee members to each competition. 
To  investigate  the  randomness  of  the  assignment  mechanism,  we  regress  a  number  of  individual 
characteristics of candidates participating at each competition (the percentage of female candidates, the 
average productivity of candidates, the number of candidates competing for the position, the percentage of 
insider candidates) on the dummy Females in Committee, controlling for sub-field dummies (since the 
random  assignment  of  evaluators  to  competitions  was  conditional  on  sub-fields)  and  for  the  type  of 
position  (a  dummy  taking  value  of  one  for  competitions  to  associate  positions  and  zero  otherwise). 
Moreover, since in building Females in Committee we only consider the percentage of females among the 
randomly  selected  evaluators  without considering  the  committee  member  appointed  by  the  university 
opening the vacancy, we also check for any possible correlation between the characteristics of the internal 
member and the presence of females among the randomly selected committee members. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. In column (1) we show that the correlation between 
the percentage of female candidates and the presence of females evaluators is far from being statistically 
significant. Similarly, there is no statistically significant correlation between the presence of females in the 
committee and the average productivity of candidates (column 2), the number of competing candidates 
(column 3) and the percentage of internal candidates (column 4). In columns 5 and 6 we show that the 
presence of female evaluators in the committee is not related to the gender or to the scientific productivity 
of the internal commissioner.  
We  also  checked  whether  the  predetermined    characteristics  are  related  to  the  percentage  of 
females in committees (% Females in Committee) instead of using the dummy Females in Committee, 
obtaining very similar results (not reported). 
As  an  alternative  check,  we  have  used  our  measures  of  committee  gender  composition  as 
dependent variables, regressing them on the full set of variables describing predetermined characteristics 
at the competition level (percentage of female candidates, average productivity, number of competitors, 
percentage of insiders) and have tested for the joint significance of these covariates. Results (not reported) 
do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of zero effects (the F-test is equal to 0.67 with a p-value of 
0.68). 
Since  female  committee  members  were  not  sorted  into  competitions  according  to  the 
characteristics of the candidates or of the internal commissioner, we conclude that the assignment of 
evaluators to each competition has been effectively random. 9 
 
 
Table 2. Regressions for Random Assignment Checks 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 





Number of  
Competitors 





Females in Committee  0.002  0.064  0.804  0.014  0.004  -0.428 
  (0.026)  (0.114)  (1.262)  (0.023)  (0.060)  (0.381) 
             
Observations  130  130  130  130  130  130 
Data  at  competition  level.  The  dependent  variable  is  reported  at  the  top  of  each  column.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parenthesis. In all the regressions we control for sub-field dummies and for type of position dummy.     
 
4. Gender Discrimination and Evaluators’ Gender: The Empirical Findings 
To uncover the effect of committee gender composition on the probability of success of candidates we 
estimate the following model:  
[1]    
ij j j ij j i j i ij X Committee in Females Female Committee in Females Female Success                     *     3 2 1 0          
 
where the dummy variable  ij Success , taking value of 1 if candidate i has won competition j, depends on the 
candidate  gender  i Female,  on  a  vector  ij X   of  the  candidate  characteristics  (including  scientific 
productivity and the dummies Insiderij and Connectionsij), our indicator of committee gender composition, 
j Committee in Females     , a dummy for the type of position,  j  , and dummies for scientific sub-fields  j  . 
To investigate whether the probability of success of candidates is affected by the gender composition of 
the  committee,  we  include  among  our  regressors  the  interaction  term  between  i Female  and 
j Committee in Females     .  Therefore,  the  coefficient  1    measures  the  effect  of  being  a  female  on  the 
probability of success when the evaluation committee is composed exclusively by men, while  3 1     
represents the extent of female discrimination (if any) when there is at least a female among the committee 
members. 
Equation [1] is estimated  using a probit model. Marginal effects are reported in Table 3. We base 
our analysis on the whole sample of candidates applying for a position to associate or full professor, 
independently from their effective participation in the competition (in Section 6 we exclude candidates 
withdrawing from competition). In all the regressions standard errors are clustered at the competition level 
to take into account that common shocks may affect the performance of all candidates participating to the 
competition.  
In the first specification of Table 3 (column 1) we estimate the difference in the probability of 
success between males and females controlling for scientific sub-field dummies, type of position and 
number of competing candidates, without taking into account other candidates' characteristics: a female 
has a lower probability of success of about 4.7 percentage points (significant at the 1 percent level). Since 10 
 
on average the probability of success for a male is about 13%, females suffer a reduction of about 36% in 
the chances of winning a competition.  
  In column 2, in order to avoid the bias that may derive from the fact that candidate’s gender may 
be related to some individual features affecting the probability of success, we include among regressors 
the comprehensive measure of scientific productivity,  Relative Productivity, and the dummy variables 
Insider,  Connections  and  University  Job.  The  candidate’s  scientific  productivity  contributes  to  the 
probability of winning though the effect is quite small in magnitude: an increase of one standard deviation 
in Relative Productivity produces an increase in the probability of success of about 3.5 percentage points. 
On the other hand, it emerges that being an insider strongly improves the probability of success (by 28 
percentage points). Connections are also relevant and increase the probability of success by 7 percentage 
points. The dummy University Job is not statistically significant. Importantly, also controlling for these 
characteristics, it emerges that females suffer a reduction of 3.7 percentage points in the probability of 
success.  
  In column 3 we estimate specification 1 adding as regressors the dummy  j Committee in Females      
and the interaction term  j i Committee in Females Female     * . It emerges that the presence of female members 
in the committee increases the probability of success of female candidates. More precisely, all-males 
committees reduce the probability of success of female candidates by 7.6 percentage points, while mixed 
sex  committees  eliminates  the  gender  discrimination  against  women.  When  among  the  committee 
members is present at least a female, the difference between males and females in the probability of 
success turns out to be equal to -0.014 with a p-value of 0.489.
6  
To analyse whether the gender discrimination implemented by all-males committees is related to 
individual characteristics, in column 4 we include the controls considered in column 2. Our results remain 
substantially unchanged as we find that committees composed exclusively by men discriminate against 
women,  reducing  their  probability  of  success  by  about  6.4  percentage  points.  However,  gender 
discrimination disappears when candidates are judged by a mixed sex committee: the difference between 
males and females is equal to -0.007 (p-value =0.737).  
Since we are controlling for scientific productivity, the estimated gender difference cannot be 
imputed to any difference of productivity between males and females. Moreover, given the controls for 
Insider and Connections, we are able to exclude that the uncovered effect depends on possible differences 
between males and females in the probability of being an insider or having a connection.  
To have an idea of the magnitude of the effect produced by a mixed sex committee on female 
candidates’ probability of success, consider that it is equivalent to the improvement deriving from an 
increase of 2 standard deviations in a candidate’s Relative Productivity. 
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committee on female candidates’ probability of success we have used the Stata command predictnl.  11 
 
  These results hold true also when – instead of using Relative Productivity – we consider separately 
our different measures of individual scientific productivity. In column 5 we report results obtained using 
the relative h index. Similar findings are obtained also using alternatively the number of publications, 
citations or the g index (not reported). 
  In column 6, instead of the dummy variable  j Committee in Females     , we consider the % Females in 
Committeej  among  the  randomly  selected  members of the  committee  as a  measure  of  committee  sex 
composition. From the coefficient on the interaction  (Female)*(% Females in Committeej) it turns out that 
one  more  female  in  the  committee  increases  the  probability  of  success  of  female  candidates  of  2.2 
percentage points. The presence of two female members in the committee reduces to zero the bias against 
women. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of the Probability of Success 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Female   -0.047***  -0.037***  -0.076***  -0.064***  -0.065***  -0.051*** 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Female*(Females in Com.)       0.076**  0.072*  0.073*   
      (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.036)   
Female*(% Females in Com.)            0.089 
            (0.063) 
Females in Com.       -0.021**  -0.020*  -0.020**   
      (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)   
% Females in Com.            -0.023 
            (0.026) 
Relative Productivity    0.020***    0.020***    0.020*** 
    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Insider    0.283***    0.283***  0.282***  0.283*** 
    (0.029)    (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Connections     0.070***    0.071***  0.069***  0.070*** 
    (0.026)    (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
University Job     -0.007    -0.006  -0.011  -0.007 
    (0.019)    (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Age    -0.001    -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Relative h-index          0.008***   
          (0.001)   
Observations  2279  2279  2279  2279  2279  2279 
Pseudo R-squared  0.041  0.166  0.066  0.170  0.167  0.167 
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects of Probit estimates (evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the 
sample). The dependent variable is Success. In all regressions we control for sub-field dummies, type of position dummy and the 
number of candidates. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the competition level) are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level. 
   
 
In Figure 1 we plot the probability of success of male and female candidates, separately for all-
males and mixed sex committees, in relation to their relative scientific productivity based on the results of 
column 4 (Table 3). The vertical distance between the continuous line (above in the figure) and the dashed 
line (below in the figure) represents the gender discrimination when the judging committee is composed 
exclusively by males. As shown in the Figure, this gap tends to close when the judging committee is 
composed also by female members: the two lines representing male’s (short dashed) and female’s (dotted) 


































-2 0 2 4 6
Relative Productivity
Male - Only Males Commitee Male - Mixed Commitee
Female - Only Males Commitee Female - Mixed Commitee
 
Figure 1. Probability of success of male and female candidates  
according to the gender composition of the committee 
 
Results similar to those shown in Table 3 are also obtained using a linear probability model (results not 
reported) instead of a probit. We have also experimented using multi-way clustering for standard errors, as 
suggested  by  Cameron  et  al.  (2006),  at  competition  and  candidate  level.  The  significance  of  the 
coefficients of interest does not change and, if anything, it slightly improves.  
 
5. Are the Effects of Mixed Sex Committee Heterogeneous across Fields 
and Positions?  
In this section we investigate whether the effects of a mixed sex committee are heterogeneous across fields 
and in relation to the type of position for which promotion is decided. We re-estimate specification 4 of 
Table 3 separately for competitions to associate and to full professor positions (respectively column 1 and 
column  2  of  Table  4).  It  emerges  that  in  competitions  to  associate  professor  committees  composed 
exclusively by males operate a stronger discrimination against women in comparison to that emerging in 
competitions to full professor positions. Moreover, the improvement produced by a mixed sex committee 
is smaller in magnitude in competitions to associate professor. More precisely, in the latter competitions, 
when evaluators are exclusively males, females experiment a reduction in the probability of success of 8 
percentage points, while the presence of a mixed sex committee reduces the bias against women to 4.7 
percentage points (statistically significant at the 5 percent level). On the other hand, in competitions to full 
professor,  when  evaluated  by  an  all-males  committee,  females’  candidates  face  a  reduction  in  the 
probability of success of 5 percentage points. In this type of competition, the bias against women vanishes 
when the evaluation committee is composed also by female members: the difference in the probability of 
success between males and females is 0.031 with a p-value of 0.280. 13 
 
All in all, these results suggest that in both type of competitions the presence of female evaluators 
enhances the probability of success of female candidates and helps at reducing the bias against women 
produced by all-males committees. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 are reported estimation results for competitions taking place in the 
fields of, respectively, Economics and Chemistry. All-male committees are gender biased in both fields, 
but  the  bias  is  larger  in  competitions  taking  place  within  the  Chemistry  field:  females  experiment  a 
reduction in the probability of success of 7 percentage points in Chemistry and 5 percentage points in 
Economics. The effect of a mixed sex committee goes in the same direction in both fields and allows male 
and female candidates to face equality of treatment. 
 
Table 4. Heterogeneous Effects across Positions and Fields 








Female   -0.080***  -0.050*  -0.051**  -0.070*** 
  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.023) 
Female*(Females in Com.)  0.038  0.120  0.063  0.070 
  (0.041)  (0.067)  (0.050)  (0.048) 
Females in Com.  -0.007  -0.028**  -0.020  -0.020 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Relative Productivity  0.024***  0.015***  0.024***  0.017*** 
  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Insider  0.292***  0.263***  0.222***  0.329*** 
  (0.038)  (0.051)  (0.046)  (0.037) 
Connections  0.065**  0.067**  0.112***  0.049 
  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.042)  (0.034) 
University Job  0.018  -0.047  0.011  -0.017 
  (0.023)  (0.037)  (0.022)  (0.035) 
Age  0.003**  -0.004**  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Observations  1235  991  997  1229 
Pseudo R-squared  0.182  0.181  0.154  0.188 
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects of Probit estimates (evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the 
sample). The dependent variable is Success. In all regressions we control for sub-field dummies, type of position dummy and the 
number of candidates. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the competition level) are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level. 
 
Since we have found quite similar results across different type of positions and different fields, it 
seems hard to argue that the discrimination of male evaluators against female candidates is related to 
unobserved quality or to the fact that male candidates perform better in some unobserved “task” that are 
particularly appreciated by males. In fact, we would have expected unobserved quality to play a major role 
in the fields in which the use of biblio-metric indexes (as those used in our analysis) to judge candidate’s 
quality is less diffuse, or in competitions to associate professor, where candidates are evaluated also in 
relation to their teaching skills (which we do not observe). However, from our estimates it emerges that 
the  gender  discrimination  practiced  by  committees  composed  exclusively  by  males  is  stronger  in 
Chemistry  than  in  Economics,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  indexes  we  use  to  measure  individual 
productivity are more widely used in Chemistry than in Economics. Furthermore, we obtain very similar 
results for competitions to associate and to full professor positions even if unobserved teaching abilities 
should matter more in competition to associate professor. 14 
 
 
6.  Discrimination,  Preferences  for  Competition  and  Self-fulfilling 
Expectations 
In principle, males’ and females’ expectations might differ ex ante and differences in expectations may 
affect outcomes ex post. More specifically, female candidates might believe that they are less likely to be 
promoted when the evaluating committee is composed exclusively by men and, as a consequence, once 
informed about the gender composition of the committee, they may decide to withdraw from competition. 
In this case, the outcome we observe would be driven by women’s expectations rather than be determined 
by the effective behavior of all-male committees. 
Thanks to the availability of information on the behavior of each candidate, we are able to check 
whether  our  results  are  driven  by  the  fact  that  female  candidates  retire  once  they  knew  the  gender 
composition of the committee. At this aim, we have excluded from our sample all the candidates who have 
withdrawn from competition (about 27% of candidates).  
  In Table 5 we present the first four specifications reported in Table 3, plus the results obtained 
separately  for  competitions  to  associate  and  full  professor  positions,  considering  only  the  sample  of 
candidates that have maintained their candidacy until the end of the competition process. Our previous 
findings are confirmed. Again, it emerges that committees composed exclusively by males discriminate 
against women reducing their probability of success: the effect is even higher in magnitude than that 
emerging from previous estimates based on the full sample of applicants. On the other hand, mixed sex 
committees tend to reduce gender discrimination. Therefore, our results are not driven by self-fulfilling 
expectations. 
Results similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 are found considering separately 
competitions to associate and full professor: discrimination against women is stronger in competitions to 
associate professor, where we also observe a smaller positive impact of mixed sex committees compared 
to that emerging in competitions to full professor. 
These  findings  also  imply  that  differences  between  males  and  females  in  preferences  for 
competition (see Bertrand, 2011) play a minor role in explaining female worse outcomes. In fact, in the 
estimates  of  Table  5  we  have  considered  subjects  who  have  applied  for  a  position  and  who  have 
maintained  their  candidacy  until  the  conclusion  of  the  evaluation  process  showing  in  this  way  their 
willingness to compete. 15 
 
Table 5. Estimates of the Probability of Success Excluding Withdrawals 














Female   -0.063***  -0.050***  -0.098***  -0.085***  -0.143***  -0.056***    
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.047)  (0.022) 
Female*(Females in Com.)       0.087**  0.092*  0.063  0.115** 
      (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.074)  (0.067) 
Females in Com.       -0.027**  -0.025*  -0.006  -0.029** 
      (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.029)  (0.014) 
Relative Productivity    0.026***    0.026***  0.043***  0.016*** 
    (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.003) 
Insider    0.282***    0.283***  0.304***  0.264*** 
    (0.034)    (0.034)  (0.050)  (0.052) 
Connections     0.085***    0.085***  0.074  0.078*** 
    (0.033)    (0.034)  (0.054)  (0.041) 
University Job     -0.035    -0.034  -0.039  -0.100 
    (0.035)    (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.052) 
Age    -0.002    -0.002  0.006***  -0.005 
    (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Observations  1652  1652  1652  1656  708  944 
Pseudo R-squared  0.079  0.183  0.082  0.187  0.171  0.192 
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects of Probit estimates (evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the 
sample). The dependent variable is Success. In all regressions we control for sub-field dummies, type of position dummy and the 
number of candidates. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the competition level) are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level. 
   
To  better  understand  candidates’  decisions  of  withdrawing  from  competition  we  have  also 
estimated a probit model considering as dependent variable a dummy taking value of 1 for candidates 
deciding  to  withdraw  from  competition  and  zero  otherwise.  Withdrawals  are  more  frequent  in 
competitions  to  associate  professor  positions  since  participation  costs  are  higher  due  to  the  fact  that 
candidates are evaluated not only in relation to their CVs but also considering their performance in a 
teaching lecture, typically given in the place where is located the university posting the vacancy. To take 
into account this  aspect, we have added to the controls used in previous estimates the dummy variable 
Distance taking the value of one when the university in which the candidate is currently employed is 
located in a geographical area that is different from that of the university initiating the competition. We 
exclude  for  each  competition  the  candidates  that  have  been  already  promoted  in  some  concluded 
competition.  
In  Table  6  are  reported  estimation  results.  In  column  1  we  estimate  the  difference  in  the 
probability of withdrawal between males and female controlling for scientific sub-field dummies, type of 
position, number of competing candidates and Distance, without taking into account other candidates' 
characteristics. It emerges that females are more likely to withdraw from competition than their male 
counterparts (+3.4 percentage points). The same result holds true when we add among controls Relative 
Productivity, Insider and Connections (column 2).  
In column 3 we investigate whether the probability of withdrawal is affected by the committee's 
gender composition. We do not find any statistically significant effect. 
In columns 4 and 5 we run separate regressions respectively for competitions to associate and to 
full  professor  positions.  It  emerges  that  females  are  more  likely  to  withdraw  from  competitions  to 
associate professor, while it does not emerge any statistically significant difference between males’ and 16 
 
females’ withdrawal decisions as regards competitions to full professor positions. Moreover, while the 
gender composition of the committee does not affect withdrawal decisions in competitions to associate 
professors, we find that in competitions to full professor positions females are less likely to retire their 
candidacy when the evaluation committee is composed also by female members. 
 
Table 6. The Determinants of Withdrawal from Competition 












Female   0.034*  0.036*  0.044  0.091**  0.003 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.046)  (0.014) 
Female*(Females in Com.)       -0.016  -0.012  -0.037* 
      (0.038)  (0.065)  (0.012) 
Females in Com.       -0.013  0.013  -0.010 
      (0.033)  (0.053)  (0.018) 
Relative Productivity    -0.009  -0.009  -0.036***  -0.004 
    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
Distance  0.128***  0.049**  0.050**  0.105**  0.045 
  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.041)  (0.031) 
Associate Professor  0.327***  0.416***  0.413***     
  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.036)     
Insider     -0.131***  -0.131***  -0.247***  -0.018 
    (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.043)  (0.016) 
Connections    -0.068***  -0.068***  -0.131***  -0.012 
    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.018) 
University Job    -0.120***  -0.126***  -0.073*  -0.223*** 
    (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.076) 
Age    0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Observations  2090  2090  2090  1146  925 
Pseudo R-squared  0.206  0.227  0.229  0.113  0.251 
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects of Probit estimates (evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the 
sample). The dependent variable is Withdrawal. In all regressions we control for sub-field dummies, type of position dummy and 
the number of candidates. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the competition level) are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level. 
   
7. Candidate Fixed Effects Estimates 
Estimates discussed in the previous sections are unbiased only if unobserved individual characteristics are 
uncorrelated  with  the  explanatory  variables  of  interest.  Since  evaluators  were  randomly  assigned  to 
competitions,  this  assumption  should  hold  true.  However,  since  a  high  number  of  candidates  have 
participated to more than one competition (666 candidates participating on average to 2.9 competitions), in 
this  Section  we  exploit  the  panel  structure  of  the  data  and  estimate  equation  [1]  by  controlling  for 
individual fixed effects. In this way, the effect of committee gender composition is estimated exploiting 
the  differences  in  outcomes  for  the  same  candidate  passing  from  all  male  evaluators’  to  mixed  sex 
committee’s competitions. For the sake of simplicity we use a linear probability model. 
In  Table  7  we  present  the  within-candidate  estimates  of  the  candidate  probability  of  being 
promoted. In these estimates we lose 351 candidates who have participated to just one competition. In all 
specifications we include the whole set of controls for competition characteristics and for candidate’s 
characteristics  varying  at  competition  level.  In  these  specifications  with  individual  fixed  effects,  the 17 
 
coefficient on  j i Committee in Females Female     *  captures the change in the probability  of success for a 
female candidate when she is evaluated by a mixed sex committee with respect to an all-male committee, 
while the coefficient on  j Committee in Females     represents the effect of a mixed sex committee on male 
candidates probability of success. In column 1, considering the whole sample, consistently with probit 
estimates shown in Table 3, it emerges that female candidates increase their probability of winning the 
competition when there is at least a female in the evaluation committee. On the other hand, the negative 
effect of a mixed sex committee on male candidates, found in probit estimates, does not appear to be 
statistically  significant  when  using  candidate  fixed  effects.  This  suggests  that  the  higher  chances  of 
success encountered by females in mixed sex committees translates in worse winning prospects for the 
males participating to just one competition, who are typically characterized by lower productivity.  
In fact, while estimates in  previous sections are based on  all the candidates, individual fixed 
effects estimates rely for each competition only on candidates participating to at least two competitions. 
However, the outcomes of these competitions may be affected by candidates competing just once (they 
may have even won) even if the latter do not contribute at defining individual fixed effects estimates.  
In columns 2 and 3 are reported results considering separately competitions to associate and full 
professor positions. While the effect of a mixed sex committee is positive but not statistically significant 
for competitions to associate professor, a positive and highly statistically significant effect emerges for 
competitions to full professor.  
Results consistent with our previous findings emerge when we run our regressions considering 
only candidates who have not withdrawn from competition. In column 4 are reported results considering 
the full sample, while in columns 5 and 6 are presented results respectively for competitions to associate 
and full professor positions. We find that the performance of female candidates significantly improves 
when there is at least a female evaluator in the judging committee. This result holds true also when we 
consider separately the two different type of competitions. Candidate fixed effects estimates suggest that 
the better treatment reserved by mixed sex committees to female candidates ends up with reducing the 
probability of success of males who apply to a single competition and who are probably characterized by a 
lower scientific productivity. Only in competitions to full professor position (see column 6) mixed sex 
committees produce a negative impact on the probability of success of male participating to more than one 
competitions.  
  In sum, the findings emerging from candidate fixed effects estimates are broadly consistent in terms of 
sign and statistical significance with the estimates of previous sections. Again, results confirm that the gender 
committee composition matters for discrimination against women.  18 
 
 
Table 7. Candidates’ fixed effects estimates: Linear Probability Model 




















Female*(Females in Com.)   0.076**  0.025  0.128***  0.114***  0.118*  0.100** 
  (0.036)  (0.053)  (0.048)  (0.037)  (0.07)  (0.040) 
Females in Com.   -0.014             0.019            -0.043  -0.035  0.024  -0.039* 
  (0.024)                                (0.040)           (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.052)  (0.023) 
Observations  1938  1049  889  1351  569  782 
Number of groups  666  377  302  613  325  296 
Notes: The Table reports estimates obtained from a linear probability fixed effects model. The dependent variable is Success. In 
all regressions we control for candidate and competition characteristics (Relative Productivity, Insider, Connections, Number of 
Competitors and  sub-field dummies). Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
8. Robustness Checks 
In this Section we present the results of a number of robustness checks. Firstly, we investigate whether our 
results are driven by the fact that female and male evaluators have different characteristics in terms of 
scientific productivity, geographical provenience and age. Secondly, we verify whether the results are 
affected by the characteristics of the internal member. Finally, we estimate our model excluding those 
fields in which the four external members of the evaluation committees have not been randomly selected 
among the whole body of full professors in the field, but among a number of elected full professors. 
  In column 1 of Table 8 we re-estimate specification 4 of Table 3 adding as controls a dummy 
variable, Highly Productive Committee, taking the value of 1 for committees with an average quality in 
terms of scientific productivity (measured with our comprehensive measure Scientific Productivity) above 
the  mean  and  an  interaction  term  between  this  variable  and  the  dummy  Female.  This  allow  us  to 
investigate  whether  female  candidates  are  more  or less favored by  evaluators  with  different research 
quality. We find that the sign of the interaction coefficient is negative, but the effect in far from being 
statistically significant. Nevertheless, adding these controls does not change our results on the effects of 
the gender committee composition on discrimination against female candidates (which hold true also 
when we measure the research quality of both candidates and committee members using the h or the g 
index - not reported). 
  In  column  2  we  report  estimates  obtained  considering  the  effect  produced  by  evaluators  of 
different age on female candidates’ probability of success. As attitudes toward gender roles may change 
over time, it could be that older generations are more female adverse while younger ones are less likely to 
discriminate against women. If male evaluators are older compared to their female counterparts, it could 
be that the positive effect of mixed sex committees on female candidates' probability of success is not 
related to the gender composition of the committee but to the age of its members. To investigate this 
aspect we have added among our controls an interaction term between the dummy Female and a dummy 
Above Mean Age Committee taking the value of 1 when the average age of committee members is above 
the mean in the sample and zero otherwise. As shown in column 2, the age of evaluators has no effect on 19 
 
the probability of success of female candidates, while the committee gender composition continues to 
produce the effects discussed above.  
We also investigate whether evaluators working in different areas of the country show different 
attitudes toward women. As shown by a number of studies, women are more likely to be relegated to 
traditional roles in the South of Italy. As a consequence, we may expect that males working in Southern 
regions are more likely to be affected by gender stereotypes and to discriminate against women. At the 
purpose of investigating this issue, we consider the fraction of evaluators working in southern regions (% 
of evaluators from the South) and interact this variable with the dummy Female. As shown in column 3 of 
Table 8, female candidates are slightly more likely to suffer discrimination when the evaluators work in 
universities  located in the  South  of  Italy  (although the  p-value  is  only  0.203).  However,  no relevant 
change is observed as regards the effect of the committee gender composition on females’ probability of 
success.  
  In column 4 we check the robustness of our results controlling for all the committee characteristics 
described above. Again our main results remain substantially unchanged. 
  Finally, in column 5 we have also included among controls the characteristics of the internal 
committee member in terms of gender and scientific productivity and have interacted these features with 
the dummy Female. The results of interest remain substantially unchanged. 
Table 8. Controlling for other committee characteristics 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Female  -0.056***         -0.044*           -0.063***         0.033    -0.056***        
  (0.018)           (0.023)           (0.022)           (0.029)     (0.018)          
Female*(Females in Committee)     0.074**           0.064*            0.072**           0.066*    0.074**          
  (0.036)           (0.036)           (0.036)           (0.036)  (0.036)          
Females in Committee    -0.021**         -0.019*           -0.020**          -0.020**    -0.021**        
  (0.010)  (0.010)           (0.010)           (0.010)    (0.010) 
Female*(Highly Productive Committee)  -0.021      -0.023  -0.021 
  (0.023)      (0.022)  (0.023) 
Highly Productive Committee    0.014        0.014      0.014 
  (0.010)      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Female*(Above Mean Age Committee)     -0.001      -0.005     
    (0.026)    (0.025)   
Above Mean Age Committee     -0.006    -0.004   
    (0.011)    (0.011)   
Female*(% of Evaluators from the South)      -0.065      -0.066     
      (0.051)  (0.049)   
% of Evaluators from the South      0.015  0.013   
      (0.020)  (0.020)   
Productivity Internal Member           0.001 
          (0.002) 
Female Internal Member          0.001 
          (0.007) 
Female Internal Member*Female          0.035 
          (0.039) 
Productivity Internal Member*Female          -0.007 
          (0.005) 
Observations  2279                                        2279  2279  2279  2279 
Pseudo R-squared  0.171             0.171             0.170             0.172    0.171            
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects of Probit estimates (evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the 
sample). The dependent variable is Success. In all regressions we control for sub-field dummies, type of position dummy and the 
number of candidates. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the competition level) are reported in 




We now turn our attention to a particular feature of the Italian rules for academic promotions in 
force during the period under examination that may potentially bias our results. According to the rules 
followed  for  the  composition  of  evaluation  committees,  in  sub-fields  where  the  number  of  opened 
vacancies was small compared to the number of available evaluators, committee members had to be 
randomly selected among a number of professors elected by the professors in the sub-field. The number of 
elected members had to be the triple of the number of evaluators needed in the n competitions opened in 
the  sub-field.
7  We  are  confident  that  this  institutional  feature  does  not  affect  our  results,  since  the 
possibility  of  influencing  the  composition  of  a  committee  in  this  system  was  remote.  The  random 
assignment checks carried out in Section 3 confirmed this assumption. 
However,  we  have  checked  the  robustness  of  our  findings  considering  exclusively  those 
competitions in which the evaluators were randomly selected from the whole body of full professors in the 
sub-field. In Table 9 we report the four main specifications reported in Table 3. Results are consistent with 
those found considering the all sample of competitions. 
 
Table 9. Only sub-fields with completely randomly selected committees 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Female   -0.052***  -0.034***  -0.073***  -0.056*** 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
Female*(Females in Com.)       0.049    0.050 
      (0.037)  (0.043) 
Female*(% Females in Com.)         
         
Females in Com.       -0.012  -0.012 
      (0.010)  (0.014) 
% Females in Com.         
         
Relative Productivity    0.022***      0.021*** 
    (0.004)    (0.004) 
Insider    0.237***    0.238*** 
    (0.035)    (0.035) 
Connections     0.080***    0.080*** 
    (0.037)    (0.037) 
University Job     0.004    0.004 
    (0.024)    (0.024) 
Age    -0.002    -0.002 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Observations  1387  1387  1387  1387 
Pseudo R-squared  0.048  0.145  0.066  0.170 
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects of Probit estimates (evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the 
sample). The dependent variable is Success. In all regressions we control for sub-field dummies, type of position dummy and the 
number of candidates. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the competition level) are reported in 




9. Concluding Remarks 
Females typically obtain worse results compared to their male counterparts in many dimensions of social 
and economic life. A large empirical evidence shows that females earn substantially less than men even 
                                                           
7 For example, suppose that 10 vacancies are opened in a subfield, then 10*4*3=120 professors must be elected. 
Each committee is then composed selecting randomly four members from this pool of 120 elected members. 21 
 
when they perform the same job and have the same qualification. In addition, the presence of females in 
top and high-ranking positions is negligible in many countries.    
  This state of affairs explains why policymakers and researchers often debate about what types of 
policies may promote gender equality. In the past, equal opportunities and equal treatment laws have been 
the main focus, reflecting the widespread idea that improvement in women’s access to education would 
have allowed them to reach positions similar to those held by men. However, this kind of policy has not 
produced the expected results and unbalances in top and influential positions still persist. Recently, in 
order  to  overcome  these  inequalities  many  countries  have  introduced  gender  parity  in  top  positions. 
However, whether the hiring or promotion of more women to influential positions represents an effective 
way to break the “glass ceiling” for females is still a matter of discussion (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; 
Pande 2003; De Paola, Scoppa and Lombardo, 2010). 
  In this paper we have tried to shed some light on this issue focusing on female performance in 
academic promotions and trying to understand whether the gender of evaluators matters. Relying on a 
large randomized natural experiment consisting in the examinations for promotion to associate and full 
professor positions in the Italian University, where the allocation of evaluators to each competition was 
random, we have investigated the candidates’ probability of success and how it is affected by the gender 
composition of evaluation committees. 
From our analysis it emerges that, even after controlling for individual characteristics, measures of 
scientific  productivity  and  indicators  of  social  connections,  females  experiment  a  considerable  lower 
probability of success. Interestingly, females’ chances of success are affected by the gender of evaluators. 
In competitions in which the evaluators are exclusively males, female candidates suffer a reduction of 
their probability of success of about 6.4 percentage points: this implies that the probability of success of 
females is about 50% lower than males. On the other hand, gender discrimination almost vanishes when 
the candidates are judged by a mixed sex committee. We find very similar results across different type of 
positions and different fields. 
Information on withdrawal decisions has allowed us to investigate whether our results are driven 
by self-fulfilling expectations or by different preferences for competition. Females may believe that they 
are less likely to succeed when the evaluation committee is composed exclusively by men and decide to 
retire from competition when facing an all-male committee. Nevertheless, we do not find evidence that the 
committee gender composition affects the candidates’ probability of withdrawing from competition. In 
addition, the discrimination against females operated by all-male committees and the positive impact of 
mixed sex committees on female candidates’ probability of success persists also when we exclude from 
our sample the candidates who have withdrawn from competition. This finding also suggests that gender 
differences  in  preferences  for  competition  does  not  play  an  important  role  in  explaining  the  worse 
performance of females. 
Our findings showing that a greater number of females in influential positions may help other 
women to advance in their career are in line with those emerging from Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) 22 
 
showing, at least for competitions to full professor in Spain, a positive effect of female evaluators on the 
probability of success of female candidates, but are in contrast with the findings of Bagues and Esteve-
Volart (2010) who, for the access to positions in the Spanish Judiciary, find that women in evaluation 
committees favor male candidates.  
These  diverging  results  suggest  that  the  attitudes  of  mixed  sex  committees  toward  male  and 
female candidates may change in relation to different contexts or in relation to the positions to be filled. 
Additional research seems necessary in order to better understand the role of females in preventing gender 
discrimination and to formulate policy recommendations aimed at promoting equality of treatment for 
men and women. 23 
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